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U.S.-Canada Bilateral Tariff Elimination:
The Role of Product Differentiation and Market Structure*
by Drusilla K. Brown and RobertM. Stern
I. Introduction
Recent empirical literature evaluating the trade and welfare effects of
the proposed U.S.-Canada free trade area (FTA) has emphasized the significant
gains associated with tariff removal on trade in differentiated products. In
this connection, there are two welfare conclusions concerning U.S.-Canada
bilateral tariff elimination that tend to dominate the public discussion of
the trade initiative. The first conclusion emphasized by the proponents of a
U.S.-Canada FTA relates to the mutual gains from capturing scale economies and
increased product variety that access to each other's market will make
possible. Moreover, the influx of tariff-free imports will improve the
competitive environment for firms selling domestically, requiring these firms
either to exit or reduce cost. Free trade, then, is expected to rationalize
the production process by increasing output per firm and lowering average
total cost.
The predicted gains from liberalization draw heavily from the literature
that compares autarky and free trade, e.g., Krugman (1979) and M{arkusen
(1981). However, from a theoretical perspective, the question of whether
there are gains from liberalization is distinct from the question of whether
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there are gains from trade. U.S. and Canadian firms already enjoy substantial
access to each other's markets. Post-Tokyo Round bilateral tariffs on U.S-
Canada trade are quite low, averaging less than two percent. Furthermore,
Canadian firms are subjected to the efficiency-stimulating experience of
competing with U.S. firms in the U.S. market. Whether small tariff changes
lead to rationalization depends on certain characteristics of the input
markets, as Flam and Helpman (1987) have shown, as well as the pro-competitive
effects emphasized in the gains-from-trade literature.
Secondly, the emphasis on trade in differentiated products in evaluating
liberalization leads to the conclusion that increased trade will be primarily
intra-industry. Inter-industry resource reallocation necessary under an FTA
is therefore presumed to be minimal. On the other hand, the policy debate has
tended to downplay the terms-of-trade changes typically associated with
tariffs, resource movements due to inter-industry trade, or the second-best
nature of bilateral tariff reductions.
Aside from the theoretical welfare issues, there are some basic modeling
choices which arise in evaluating the bilateral tariff elimination using
computable general equilibrium techniques. In particular, U.S.-Canada
bilateral trade flows which are the subject of tariff removal must be
identifiable.
There are four basic approaches to this problem. First, there is the
textbook model that examines the case in which each good is homogeneous across
firms and countries. The implication of this framework is that some bilateral
trade flows will cease with bilateral tariff elimination. Typically the
smaller country in the FTA will trade within the FTA only.
In order to avoid this particular pattern of trade in which some
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bilateral trade flows disappear, it is common to adopt some form of product or
market differentiation. One popular approach has been to assume that products
are differentiated by place of production, embodied in the Armington (1969)
assumptions. Alternatively, there are two other modeling approaches that
draw upon the behavior of imperfectly competitive firms. The first is to
assume that there is product differentiation at the firm level rather than at
the national level. The second alternative is to assume that all firms supply
a homogeneous product, but that national markets are segmented, as in Venables
(1985). Thus, firms make separate price and supply decisions for each
national market based on the perceived elasticity of demand.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze some important issues that arise
in the modeling of bilateral tariff removal and to assess these issues
computationally in the context of the U.S.-Canada FTA. Our paper is
structured as follows. The differentiated products models are discussed in
the following section, and the theoretical relationship between tariff
liberalization and firm output is developed. We also comment on the demand
structure adopted in some previous modeling efforts. In particular we will
discuss the practice of assuming both firm and national product
differentiation and the implications for the debate concerning intra- vs.
inter-industry'trade, rationalization of the production process, and the gains
from trade.
In section III, we present a market segmentation model and discuss the
likely welfare implications of bilateral tariff removal. The issues raised
are then illustrated using a computational model designed to analyze U.S. -
Canada bilateral tariff removal. The model is discussed in section IV and
computational results are presented in section V. Conclusions follow.
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II. The Differentiated Products Models
The earliest versions of the differentiated products models involved
differentiating by country of origin using the Armington assumptions. 'Love
of variety' in the utility function guarantees that all bilateral trade flows
will continue following the formation of the preferential trading club as long
as industries are not eliminated in any country. Models of this type tend to
assume that production is characterized by constant returns to scale and firms
are perfectly competitive.
There is an important difficulty, however, with the national product
differentiation (NPD) model insofar as it means that each country will have a
monopoly in the supply of its own characteristic variety. 2 Consequently,
optimal tariffs tend to be large, even for small countries. Terms of trade
changes, rather than efficiency gains, therefore dominate the welfare
predictions of NPD models.
NPD is the approach adopted by Brown and Stern (1987), who find that
Canada's welfare declines by 0.3 percent as the result of bilateral tariff
removal. This result appears to emerge because removal of the relatively high
tariffs currently in place in Canada leads to a deterioration in the terms of
trade. On the other hand, Hamilton and Whalley (1985) consider nontariff
barrier (NTB) removal as well as bilateral tariff removal and find that Canada
enjoys a 0.7 percent increase of GDP from the formation of an FTA presumably
because of the relatively high NTBs in the United States.
An alternative is to differentiate products at the firm level, using the
Dixit-Stiglitz-Spence form of the utility function. Love of variety will
again guarantee the existence of all bilateral trade flows, since no two firms
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in the world sell the same variety. In this model, firms are typically
assumed to have downward sloping average total cost curves and to be
monopolistically competitive.
Harris (1984) developed the imperfectly competitive approach,
computationally, incorporating a variety of different assumptions concerning a
firm's price setting behavior. The Harris approach yielded startling results.
Multilateral pre-Tokyo Round tariff removal was shown to increase Canada's
welfare by up to 9 percent of GDP, depending on the precise assumptions
concerning firm behavior. Increasing firm output, thereby reducing average
total cost, is a key source of welfare gain in the imperfectly competitive
computational trade models. Subsequent revisions of tariff data and
parameters of the model, however, place the welfare gain for Canada in the
Harris model closer to 2.5 percent of GDP. 3
In this section, we will first describe a typical monopolistically
competitive (MC) trade model and evaluate the effects of tariff liberalization
on firm output. The NPD model and the MC model are then compared in terms of
the implications of a tariff for the terms of trade and intra- vs. inter-
industry trade.
Assume a model consisting of n traded goods that are produced by m
countries. Good j produced by each firm in each of the m countries is
aggregated using a linearly homogeneous aggregation function to form a
composite good j. Following Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
modelers have typically chosen the CES function to aggregate different
varieties into a single aggregate. The conditional demand in country i for
the product of a representative firm in country r that produces good j for a
CES aggregation function is
6
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where Pi; is the price paid in country i for good j produced by a
representative firm in country r, Ei is expenditure in country i on the
aggregate good j, n,, is the number of firms in industry j in country s, and
o>1 is the elasticity of substitution among the different varieties.
Firms set price as a mark-up over marginal cost according to
(2) - MCrj(1+1/r)rj~-
where P=; is the price received by a representative producer of j in country
r, rrj < -1 is the firm's perceived elasticity of demand, and MCrj is marginal
cost. The firm's perceived elasticity of demand is a sales weighted average
of the elasticities of demand in each national market. The elasticity of
demand in country i for the product of a representative firm in country r is
obtained from equation (1) above to be
Pi D.
(3) r- -a + (0-1) E.
or
(3') r; - -a + (O-1) f
where B is country r's share of the market in country i for good j.
The firm's production function requires a fixed input of capital plus
7
variable capital and labor inputs that are characterized by constant returns
to scale. Thus, the average total cost (ATC) curve is downward sloping and
marginal cost is constant. Entry occurs until profits are eliminated,
requiring the firm's price to equal ATC,
(4) p=(K (X+ar)+wajrj rjq. i rji
where Pr is the price of capital in country r and wr is the return to labor,
a is the variable capital unit input requirement in industry j and a is the
unit labor requirement, KF is the fixed capital requirement, and qrj is output
of a typical firm in industry j in country r.
Capital and labor are assumed to be mobile between sectors. The return
to each factor is determined to equate demand to a fixed supply.
Finally, tariff policy serves to link the price received by the seller to
the price paid by the buyer. Thus
(5) Pi = Pj (1 + tip)
where tip is the ad valorem tariff that country i imposes on imports of good j
from country r.
Rationalization
We now examine the conditions under which tariff liberalization will lead
to rationalization of production in this model. That is, will a tariff
reduction increase output per firm and lower average total cost? There are
several considerations that determine the effect of liberalization on
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rationalization, such as differing factor intensities across industries and
the effect of liberalization on the elasticity of demand.
Turning first to the production side, suppose that there are two
industries and industry l's fixed capital input requirement is zero.
Throughout this exercise we will hold the shape of the demand curve fixed so
as to focus on technological determinants of firm output.
Equilibrium in the labor market requires that
(6) L-a Q1 +a n2q 2
where L is the endowment of labor, Q1 is output of industry 1, and n2q2 is
output of industry 2. Proportionate differentiation yields
(6') ALl q + AL2( 2 + 12 L
where S -XA1 9 K1U + A XL2 2,
Af is industry j's share of the employment of factor f, 6fj is factor f's
share of total cost in industry j, O is variable factor f's share of
variable cost in industry j , and og is the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor in industry j.
Similarly, capital market equilibrium requires
(7) K-af Q1 + afn 2q 2 +n 2 KF
which when proportionately differentiated yields
A
9
(7') AK1Q1 + An (q 2 + n 2 ) + A e12 -
6K (W - P )
where 6 K - A 9iLal + AKZOL2 2,
4K is variable capital in industry 2's share of capital employment, A is
fixed capital in industry 2's share of capital employment, and AX + A4-K A2
is industry 2's share of capital employment.
A tariff reduction will lower demand for the domestically produced good,
yielding negative profits for domestic firms. The question is, will output
per firm in industry 2 rise or fall as firms exit? Suppose first that q2 is
held constant as n2 falls so that firms neither rationalize nor de-
rationalize. The mark-up pricing rule used by firms requires that the percent
change in price be equal to the percent change in marginal cost, if the
elasticity of demand is held constant. Therefore
(8) P2 = 9L 2 i+6K2P
On the other hand, the zero-profit condition requires that the percent change
in price be equal to the percent change in ATC. Therefore
(9) P2 -OLa w+Ox2P - 6602
Now, as industry 2 contracts and industry 1 expands , relative factor
prices must also be adjusting. As a result, equations (8) and (9) cannot be
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satisfied simultaneously if output per firm is held constant. This conclusion
follows from the assumption that capital is the only fixed factor, -which
implies that labor's share of variable cost must be greater than labor's share
of total cost and capital's share of variable cost must be smaller than
capital's share of total cost.
The necessary change in firm output will depend on the relative factor
intensity ranking of- the two industries. It can be demonstrated using
equations (6') and (7') that, if industry 2 is the capital intensive industry
A 0
ranked according to its variable inputs, then w - PK > 0 as resources are
transferred from industry 2 to industry 1. On the other hand, if industry 2
is the labor intensive industry, then w - PK < 0. That is
Kv
w < P as AU K2 AKi AL2.
For the case in which industry 2 is relatively labor intensive, so that
w - PK < 0, marginal cost has fallen relative to ATC, requiring output per
firm to rise. However, if industry 2 is relatively capital intensive, then
marginal cost has risen relative to ATC, requiring output per firm to fall.
As a general rule, if an industry's intensively used factor has a greater
share in variable cost than in total cost, then a policy that lowers price
will also lead to rationalization. On the other hand, if an industry's
intensive factor has a smaller share in variable cost than in total cost, then
de-rationalization will occur, 4 It should also be noted that, if
technological considerations are leading to rationalization of the domestic
industry, de-rationalization will be occurring in the foreign industry.
There are, of course, several demand side considerations that will also
A
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help determine firm output. An increase in the absolute value of the firm's
perceived elasticity of demand will lower the mark-up over marginal cost, so
that firm output will rise. To the extent that liberalization increases the
number of firms in the industry world wide, reducing individual firm market
share, the second term on the right hand side of equation (3) will become
smaller so that the absolute value of the elasticity will rise.
On the other hand, as noted by Horstmann and Markusen (1986), ad valorem
tariff reductions tend to steepen the demand curve facing the foreign firm,
lowering the elasticity of demand and lowering output per firm. This point
can be seen by differentiating equation (3) with respect to ti, using
equation (5).
Tariff Liberalization and the Terms of Trade
It is reasonable to presume that a tariff reduction on imports of the
monopolistically competitive good 2 will tend to lower the price received by
domestic producers, P2, relative to the price paid for imports, P2, thus
worsening the terms of trade for the liberalizing country. The terms of trade
for the competitive good will also deteriorate. The tariff reduction will
shift production in the home country toward good 1 and away from good 2. Thus
P1/PZ will rise. If the home country is a net exporter of good 2 and an
importer of good 1, then the increase in P1 /P2 constitutes a fall in the price
of exports. The tariff reduction will also shift production in the foreign
country toward good 2 and away from good 1. Thus P1/Pi will fall. If the
home country is a net importer of good 2 and an exporter of good 1, then the
fall in P1/Pi also constitutes a deterioration in the home country's terms of
trade.
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The welfare implications of the relative price changes for the home
country should nonetheless be smaller than in the more conventional Armington
model in which goods are differentiated at the national level and individual
firms are price takers. This will be the case for two reasons.
First, the powerful terms-of-trade gain from a tariff in the NPD model
stems from the fact that firms, as price-takers, do not internalize the market
power attendant to national product differentiation. Thus, a tariff that
reduces national supply to the world market, exploits monopoly power ignored
by the firms. However, if product differentiation exists at the firm level
rather than at the national level, there is little market power associated
with product differentiation that can be perceived by the government that is
not already exercised by the firm.
Second, the number of differentiated products in an NPD model equals the
number of countries. On the other hand, the number of products in a
monopolistically competitive model is significantly larger and equal to the
sum over the number of firms in each country. By increasing the number of
products, the market power of the seller of an individual product is reduced,
leaving less room to increase welfare by reducing supply.
The terms-of-trade loss of the home country may be further mitigated if
rationalization occurs in the foreign country. An increase in output per firm
is associated with a reduction in the mark-up over marginal cost, offsetting
some of the original increase in price by foreign firms.
Increasing Returns to Scale and National Product Differentiation
Implementation of the differentiated products model computationally does
13
not require national product differentiation. Nonetheless, the tendency has
been to preserve both national and firm product differentiation. In this
context, a third level is added to the utility function. Expenditure on
imports is allocated among competing sources following the decision concerning
allocation between an import aggregate and a domestic aggregate. For example,
Wigle (1988) adopts this approach and finds that bilateral tariff removal
would reduce welfare in Canada by 0.1 percent of GDP.
National product differentiation is not necessary to explain cross-
hauling in models with firm product differentiation. It may nonetheless seem
plausible to retain a preference for the domestically produced good in the
utility function. However, if perfect aggregation is used to form separate
domestic and import aggregates, then domestic firms are insulated from changes
in the composition of the import aggregate with the consequence of introducing
a new equilibrating mechanism that has questionable economic content.
Adding a third stage to the budgeting process will have three
implications for the computational results. First, the model will be
predisposed toward the conclusion that free trade will- stimulate intra-
industry trade, thus minimizing the necessary inter-sectoral adjustment. To
see this point, consider the extreme case in which consumers distinguish
between the import and the domestic variety of good j, Dj, but all firms
within a country produce perfect substitutes. That is
(10) D= [(D )' + ( ""
where the domestic variety, Dd, and the imported variety, D', are given by
14
d ndj dnmj(11) D X. and Dmn- X
i-=1 3 J imi 3
where ndj is the number of domestic firms, rni is the number of foreign firms
in industry j, and Xi denotes the output of the ith firm. This is the case
analyzed by Horstmann and Markusen (1986).5 A key assumption in this
framework is that the number of firms in the domestic industry does not affect
demand facing an individual foreign firm, nor does the number of firms in the
foreign industry affect the demand facing an individual domestic firm.
A tariff on imports will stimulate demand for the domestic variety and
reduce demand for the foreign variety, leaving domestic firms with positive
profits and foreign firms with negative profits. To restore the zero-profit
condition, entry occurs domestically while foreign firms exit. Since domestic
firm demand does not depend on the number of foreign firms, entry in the
domestic industry reduces individual firm demand until profits are once again
zero. The opposite occurs for foreign firms. The essential equilibrating
mechanism here is that local entry dissipates positive profits by dividing the
market among a larger number of firms, thereby reducing firm output and
raising average fixed cost. Indeed, Horstmann and Markusen conclude that the
tariff change has no effect on domestic firm output. 6
In comparison, consider the model outlined above, in which consumers
distinguish between the output of different firms but not between imports and
the domestic good. In this case, the level of firm demand depends not on
whether there is local entry or exit, but rather on whether there is global
entry or exit. If the increase in the number of domestic firms is smaller
than the fall in the number of foreign firms, then all firms in the industry,
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both domestic and foreign, will experience an increase in demand. As a
result, positive profits for domestic firms will increase even further.
Entry in the domestic industry restores the zero-profit condition by
raising the return to the factor used intensively in the expanding sector,
which raises total cost. The effect of local entry on firm demand, which
occurs in the Horstmann-Markusen model, is absent here. Thus, restoring the
zero-profit condition depends entirely on inter-sectoral factor movements.
The second implication of adding a third stage to the budgeting process
is that reducing the change in factor prices necessary to restore equilibrium
will also weaken the forces leading to rationalization or de-rationalization
associated with differing factor intensities. The third implication is that
reintroducing national product differentiation increases national market power
which is not perceived by firms, thus raising the optimal tariff.
Summary
There are a few lessons that we can draw in comparing the likely welfare
and trade conclusions of each approach for a U.S.-Canada bilateral tariff
elimination which will be relevant for the computational results presented
below. Welfare conclusions from a model assuming perfect competition and
national product differentiation will be dominated by changes in the terms of
trade. The average level of tariffs currently in place in Canada is somewhat
higher than in the United States. This implies that tariff elimination will
tend to worsen Canada's terms of trade, resulting in a welfare loss. In
addition, the inter-sectoral trade pattern will not be particularly affected




In contrast, if industries are monopolistically competitive, then product
differentiation is removed to the firm and firms incorporate market power
associated with product differentiation into their pricing decisions.
Therefore, welfare-reducing changes in the terms of trade as the result of
liberalization will be confined primarily to large countries and are not
likely to play a dominant role in the welfare conclusions of bilateral tariff
removal. Consequently, welfare gains for Canada are more likely than in the
NPD model. Further, more distinctive changes in the inter-sectoral pattern of
specialization will emerge in view of the fact that each variety of a good is
not nationally specific. Production can be relocated in the country where the
cost of production is lowest.
Rationalization of the production process will depend on the general
equilibrium effects of tariff liberalization on the return to capital, which
in turn depends on the relative factor-intensity ranking of industries. If
the protected sector is labor intensive, so that liberalization causes the
return to capital to rise, output per firm will tend to rise. However, if the
protected sector is capital intensive, then the return to capital is likely to
fall. Consequently, firm output may fall, as well.
III. A Market Segmentation Model
Another alternative to modeling bilateral tariff elimination is to assume
that all firms sell a homogeneous product but that national markets are
segmented. Thus, all firms selling to a single national market must charge
the same price, but price may vary across countries. This approach has not
been used previously in the context of U.S. -Canada bilateral tariff removal,
but has been applied to the European Community by Smith and Venables (1988).
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Here we extend the model of Venables (1985) to three countries.
The market demand in country j is
(12) D- S J(D - p.) j-1,2,3
where p is the price paid by consumers in country j and Si is a parameter
indicating the size of market j. Firms are assumed to behave as Cournot
followers, so that the perceived demand is the market demand net of supply by
other firms. Therefore, a typical firm in country i perceives the demand for
its exports to country j to be
(13) xi - S (D - p.) - Q j7'i
where Qj is supply by other firms, and demand in the local market to be
(14) y. - Si(D - p.) - Qi.
As above, each firm in country i faces a fixed cost, fi, and constant marginal
cost, ci, yielding profits of
(15) r - (p. - c1 - t.)xi + (p. - ci)y - f.7#i 3J ~ i i
where t 3 is the tariff imposed by country j on imports. The first order
conditions for profit maximization are
(16) xi- Sg(p -ci - t) i/j
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and
(17) y - Si(p - ci).
Free entry guarantees that profits will be zero, which when making use of the
first-order conditions for profit maximization, equations (16) and (17),
implies that
(18) E(p - ci - t.) 2 S.+ (p - c1) 2 Si - fi - 0.
Consider now the effect of a tariff change by country 2 on imports from
country 1. Totally differentiating equation (18) for each i yields
y x1 x1 [~~dp 1  ..
(19) xL2 dp2 - [ -t j
_ XiXi 7 . -dp3
Solving for the equilibrium price changes yields
r dp -23 + xx
dp a -x1dt2 1 xx(20) dp2  XAdt2 3
dpa x2 - x1x2
where A wh e Y -y2y 3 x) xiy 3x2 -4x) x(y 2xx~x3)
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If A is positive7 and ci < c +ti, then it can be shown that dp1 /dt 2 > 0.
The restriction on marginal cost implies that a typical domestic firm sells
more to the domestic market than a typical foreign firm. In this case, the
tariff imposed by country 2 raises the price paid by consumers in country 1,
thus lowering welfare in country 1. If, in addition, y3x2 > xix2, then it
follows that dp2/dt 2 < 0. The tariff lowers the price to consumers in country
2, raising welfare in country 2.8
The impact of a tariff imposed by country 2 in this model is to lower the
price net of tariff that country 1 firms receive for their exports to country
2. In order to restore the zero-profit condition, country 1 firms must
increase price in other markets, such as in the domestic market. However, the
higher price in country l's market raises profitability for country 2 firms,
leading to a reduction in price on sales to domestic consumers. The price
increase to country 1 consumers lowers welfare in country 1 and the price
reduction in country 2 raises consumer welfare in country 2.
This outcome, of course, is not inevitable. Negative profits for country
1 firms are eliminated by raising the price in countries in which country 1
firms have a relatively large market share. The change in relative price,
then, will depend closely on the pattern of trade and pre-existing market
share.
In the U.S.-Canada case, the volume of trade between the United States
and Canada is large, while trade between Canada and the rest of the world is
comparatively small. A tariff reduction by Canada will raise the
profitability of U.S. firms. A price reduction in the United States which
lowers profits of U.S. firms, and a price increase in Canada and the rest of
the world which offsets the price reduction in the U.S. market are likely.
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IV. The Computational Model
Sections III and IV leave us with a set of propositions concerning the
implications of modeling choices which we would like to illustrate
computationally. There are three variants of the model. The perfect
competition (PC) version is characterized by national product differentiation,
perfect competition, and constant returns to scale. The monopolistic
competition (MC) version differs in that product differentiation exists only
at the firm level, there are increasing returns to scale, and firms set price
as a mark-up over marginal cost. In the market segmentation (MS) version
there are economies of scale as well, but each product is homogeneous across
firms and countries. Firms behave as Cournot followers and perceive national
markets as segmented. 9
Canada, the United States, and a group of thirty-two other countries are
modeled explicitly, and the rest of the world constitutes an abbreviated
fourth region. Our sectoral coverage includes twenty-two tradable product
categories based on three-digit ISIC industries and seven nontradable
categories based on one-digit ISIC industries.10
In all three models, consumers initially allocate final demand and
producers allocate intermediate demand across sectors without regard to the
location of production. Bilateral trade flows are identified in the PC model
by assuming that consumers and producers aggregate the variety produced by
each country using a CES aggregation function. Thus, the demand in country i
for the output of country r's production of good j, conditional on expenditure
on the aggregate good j , E1g, is
21
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where Pi is the price consumers in i pay for good j produced in country r.
This price differs from the price received by the seller in country r by any
tariffs imposed by country i.
Bilateral trade flows in the MC model are similarly identified, though
product differentiation exists at the firm level only. Monopolistically
competitive firms set price as a mark-up over marginal cost according to
equation (2) and the firm's perceived elasticity of demand is given by
equation (3).
In the MS model consumers do not distinguish between the output of
various firms or countries. Rather, firms perceive national markets as
segmented. The firm sets price and supply in each market to maximize firm
profits. That is
max E Di. [Pr. -MC.] - FCr-
{P p i,...,Pm} i 1
where MC and FC are marginal and fixed costs, and Pr is the price a typical
firm in country r receives for sales in country i. This price differs from
the price paid by consumers in country i by any tariffs imposed. Firms behave
as Cournot followers. Therefore, the firm's perceived demand, D ;, is the
market demand in country i for good j, D1 , less output by other firms, Q.
The underlying utility function determining industry demand is Cobb-Douglas.
Under this assumption it can be shown that the supply to country i by a
s !
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representative firm in country r is
(PI - MC )
(22) Srj = D r
Pr
The production function in all three models requires intermediate and
primary inputs. Intermediate inputs and a primary input aggregate are
employed in fixed proportion to output. The primary input aggregate is a CES
function of capital and labor employed. Capital and labor demand are
determined by minimizing the cost of attaining the level of the primary input
aggregate required by the upper level of the production function. In addition
to variable capital and labor inputs, a fixed input of capital is necessary in
the MC and MS models.
Capital and labor are mobile between sectors but not countries. The
return to capital is determined to equate demand to a fixed supply of capital.
The return to labor, is held constant. National income is adjusted to maintain
total employment at the base level.
Freedom of entry is assumed and, therefore, firm profits are zero. This
implies that PC firms must set price equal to marginal cost, MC firms must set
price equal to average total cost, and MS firms must set average price to
average total cost.
Equilibrium prices are determined in global markets to equate supply and
demand. In the PC model one price is determined for each national variety of
each good. In the MC model one price is determined for each firm. However,
firms within each country face identical costs and technology and demand is
symmetric. Therefore, all firms within an industry and country charge the
same price. In the MS model one price is determined for each national market.
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Thus, all firms selling in a single market must charge the same price.
The base year for data on production, employment, and trade for the
United States, Canada, and other countries and the rest of the world is 1976.
Input-output coefficients for the production function were derived from the
U.S. input-output table for 1972 and the Canadian table for 1976.
The key parameters in the base period for the MC model are obtained in
the following manner. 1 The firm's perceived demand in the base period is
calculated according to equation (3), assuming that the elasticity of
substitution among varieties of each good is 15.0.
Once the elasticity of demand is determined, it is straightforward to
calculate the variable input share of total cost. The variable cost share is
equal to the ratio of marginal cost and average total cost, PVC - M /ATC.
Since profits are zero, average total cost is equal to price. The ratio of
marginal cost and price is determined by the mark-up pricing rule in equation
(2). Therefore, vc - 1 + 1/n.
The share of total capital that is variable is implied by the variable
cost share, capital's primary input cost share, 68, and the primary input
share of total cost, b0 . Capital is assumed to be the only fixed factor.
Therefore, the share of capital which is fixed is equal to the ratio of fixed
cost's share of total cost to capital's share of total cost. That is
1 v K F VF(23) 6Kb0  P (KF + K)/TC KF + K
The distribution of primary input cost between capital and labor is available




The relationship between fixed capital's share of total capital and the
elasticity of substitution in the aggregation function places restrictions on
the size of the elasticity of substitution. A small value for a can imply a
fixed capital share which does not lie between zero and one. Setting a-15 was
the smallest value for this parameter consistent with the restrictions on the
fixed capital share.
Structural equations of the MS model also imply base period-values for
the parameters. The mark-up over marginal cost, (P-MC)/MC, for each of the




where M= is the mark-up over marginal cost by producers in country r on their
sales to country i and 6 is country r's share of the market in country i.
This procedure tended to lead to very small mark-ups for many industries
which caused instability in the computational model. Therefore, the mark-ups
are bounded from below by 5 percent. Utility functions other than Cobb-
Douglas may produce larger mark-ups. However, it may also be the case that
this model is unsuitable for modeling sectors which are not highly
concentrated.
The variable cost share for the MS model can be obtained in a manner
similar to the method employed with the MC model. Variable cost share is
equal to the ratio of marginal cost 'to average cost. The zero-profit
condition implies that the average price received by the firm for its sales in





where S is the share of country r's output which is sold to country i.
Equation (22) can be used to find that
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V. Computational Results of U.S.-Canada Bilateral Tariff Elimination
The models described in section IV have been used to analyze
computationally the effects of bilateral tariff removal by the United States
and Canada. Our purpose here is to illustrate the implications of various
modeling choices for the trade and welfare conclusions of U.S.-Canada
bilateral tariff removal. The model was run three times, employing each of
the three different market structures in all industries: perfect competition,
monopolistic competition, and market segmentation. It is of course more
plausible to assume that market structure will vary across industries.
Results reflecting our best judgement concerning the proper market structure
for each industry can be found in Brown and Stern (1988).
Tariffs removed are those prevailing in both countries subsequent to full
implementation of the Tokyo Round tariff reductions that was completed in
1987. The last column of each of Tables 2 and 3 list the bilateral trade
weighted ad valorem tariff equivalents on U.S. -Canada trade. Notice that U.S.
tariffs on Canadian exports are somewhat lower than Canadian tariffs on the
United States. Nevertheless, U.S. tariffs on Canadian exports on some
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products such as clothing and footwear remain quite high.
The results for imports, exports, the exchange rate, terms of trade, and
welfare are summarized in Table 1. Section A of Table 1 reports the change in
trade and welfare under perfect competition. U.S. and Canadian trade
increases by close to $7 billion, while ROW trade falls by nearly $2 billion.
The welfare and terms of trade changes are similar to those obtained elsewhere
using such a model1 2 and the role of national product differentiation is
clearly evident. The comparatively deep tariff reductions by Canada worsen
its terms of trade by 0.7 percent, leading to a trivial decline in welfare.
U.S. terms of trade, on the other hand, improve by 0.3 percent, raising U.S.
welfare by $781 million based on 1976 trade. ROW welfare declines as well.
The outcome is somewhat different if industry structure is taken to be
monopolistically competitive. These results are presented in section B of
Table 1. U.S. and Canadian trade increases by about $9 billion. The U.S.
terms-of-trade gain is now only one-third as large (0.1%) and Canada's terms
of trade loss is about 30 percent smaller (-0.5%). This result was expected.
The move from products differentiated at the national level to products
differentiated at the firm level significantly increases the number of
products, thereby increasing the elasticity of demand for each individual
variety. In addition, rationalization occurs in the United States as a result
of liberalization, forcing U.S. firms to reduce the mark-up over marginal
cost.
The U.S. welfare gain is accordingly reduced to $476 million, but
Canada's welfare gain rises to $2.3 billion, which is 1.2 percent of Canadian
GDP in 1976. There are several possible explanations for the welfare
improvement for Canada. First, a smaller deterioration in Canada's terms of
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trade will reduce the welfare loss. Second, as discussed above, internalizing
market power by differentiating products at the firm level, rather than at the
national level, lowers Canada's optimal tariff. Thus, despite the
deterioration in the terms of trade, Canadian welfare still rises due to
efficiency gains. Third, Canada may be gaining from rationalizing production.
In order to illustrate the sensitivity of the model to the choice of the
elasticity of substitution, the PC and MC versions of the model were rerun
after increasing the elasticity of substitution. Values for this parameter
ranged from 17 to 45 across industries, compared to 15 in the base run. These
results are summarized in sections D and E of Table 1.
In the case of perfect competition, the most notable effect of increasing
the elasticity of substitution is to increase the change in the volume of
trade. The impacts on the terms of trade and welfare are trivial. This is
not the case, however, if firms are monopolistically competitive. The terms-
of-trade changes are further weakened as the elasticity of substitution
increases. In particular, Canada's terms of trade deteriorate by only 0.3
percent, as compared to 0.5 percent in the base run and 0.7 percent under
national product differentiation. Canada's welfare gain rises to 1.4 percent
of GDP.
Section C of Table 1 summarizes the effects of liberalization in the
market segmentation model. The trade impact is significantly larger than for
the other two market structures, with U.S. and Canadian trade increasing by
about $11 - $13 billion. The terms of trade effects are similar to those
which obtained in the MC model, but welfare for all three country groups
declines. It should be noted at the outset that the market segmentation model
is a poor approximation of firm behavior in unconcentrated industries.
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Results presented for this version of the model should therefore be considered
illustrative only. Little weight should be attached accordingly to the
aggregate measures such as the terms of trade and welfare.
Sectoral Results: Perfect Competition and Monopolistic Competition
Sectoral results for each experiment are presented in Tables 2 to 7.
Tables 2 and 3 report the percent change in exports, imports, bilateral trade,
output, capital employment, the return to capital, and labor employment due to
bilateral liberalization under perfect competition for the United States and
Canada, respectively. Tables 4 and 5 report similar values for the
monopolistic competition model. The percent changes in the number of firms
and in the firm's perceived elasticity of demand are also included.
The most notable feature of the PC model is the strong tendency toward
increased intra-industry trade. Bilateral trade increases in virtually every
sector. The only exception is that Canadian imports of transportation
equipment from the United States fall by 3.2 percent. Total trade for both
countries generally increases as well. U.S. imports increase in every sector
and Canada's imports decline only in petroleum products and transportation
equipment.
Employment effects are equally small. The largest decline in employment
in the United States is 1.3 percent in nonferrous metals. Significantly more
labor adjustment is required in Canada. For example, employment in textiles
falls by 25.0 percent.
In comparison, the inter-industry impact of liberalization is much more
pronounced under monopolistic competition. While liberalization causes U.S.
imports from Canada to rise in every sector in the PC model, U.S. imports from
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Canada in the MC model fall in wood products (-9.2%), paper products (-23.3%),
printing and publishing (-6.7%), chemicals (-48.3%), petroleum products
(-12.0%), nonmetallic mineral products (-8.9%), and miscellaneous manufactures
(-1.3%).
Inter-industry specialization in production, particularly for Canada,
follows a similar pattern. Under MC, output in Canada declines in sixteen of
the 22 tradable sectors, as compared to eight sectors that decline in the PC
model. The expanding sectors are leather products (37.2%), footwear (2.8%),
rubber products (18.7%), iron and steel (27.4%), nonferrous metals (68.1%),
and transportation equipment (85.1%). On the other hand, U.S. output declines
in several of these sectors, such as leather products (-0.5%), rubber products
(-0.7%), iron and steel (-1.6%), nonferrous metals (-6.5%), and transportation
equipment (-7.6%).
The degree to which firms rationalize or de-rationalize can be determined
by comparing industry output to the number of firms. If the percent change in
industry output exceeds the percent change in the number of firms, then output
per firm must have risen. In the case of the United States, rationalization
occurs in every sector except miscellaneous manufactures. In that industry,
output rises by 2.0 percent but the number of firms increases by 2.3 percent.
This is not a particularly surprising result. The return to capital in
the United States rises by 0.1 percent, causing ATC to increase. Firms return
to the zero-profit position by increasing output.
On the demand side, the reduction in Canada's tariffs was expected to
reduce the perceived demand elasticity of U.S. firms, while the fall in the
U.S. tariff should have raised the firm's perceived elasticity of demand.
Overall, the demand elasticity increased, reducing mark-up over marginal cost
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and further raising firm output. Miscellaneous manufactures is the only
industry in the United States for which the firm's perceived elasticity of
demand falls. The increased market power attendant to a fall in elasticity
induces profit maximizing firms to reduce output and increase the mark-up of
price over marginal cost. Thus, as noted above, output per firm in the
industry also falls.
Rationalization effects for Canada are mixed. The comparatively deep
tariff reductions by Canada would have been expected to increase the
elasticity of demand and increase firm output. However, the return to capital
fell in Canada by 1.1 percent, which tends to lower firm output.
Rationalization occurred in 15 of the 22 tradable industries in Canada, but
de-rationalization occurred in all of the nontradable industries.
The tradable industries in which firm output declined are agriculture,
wood products, paper products, printing and publishing, chemicals, and
nonmetallic mineral products. These tend to be the industries in which
Canadian tariffs are already quite low. (Canadian average tariffs on U.S.
exports of agricultural products is 2.2%, wood products 2.5%, printing and
publishing 1.1%, and nonmetallic mineral products 4.4%.) Consequently, tariff
reductions did little to increase the perceived elasticity of demand of
Canadian firms.
We conclude then that the relatively large increase in welfare for Canada
may in part be due to realized economies of scale. However, the U.S. welfare
gain is distinctly smaller even though rationalization occurs much more
consistently across all U.S. industries. Therefore, it is likely that inter-
sectoral specialization is playing an important role as well.
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Sectoral Results: Market Segmentation Model
Sectoral results for U.S.-Canada bilateral tariff removal in the market
segmentation model are presented in Table 6 for the United States and Table 7
for Canada. The special characteristics of the market segmentation model are
most readily apparent when examining the production and price changes in the
United States. The reduction in Canadian tariffs on U.S. exports raises the
after-tariff price received by U.S. exporters, thus increasing firm profits.
The zero-profit condition is restored by a reduction in the price received for
sales to the domestic market. As can be seen from column 7 of Table 6, the
price paid by U.S. consumers for tradable goods generally declines. The only
exceptions are leather products, iron and steel, and transportation equipment.
In addition, entry occurs in most U.S. industries. The number of U.S.
firms declines only in leather products (-42.2%), petroleum products (-4.4%),
rubber products (-0.4%), iron and steel (-1.8%), metal products (-0.1%), and
transportation equipment (-18.0%).
The tariff reductions by the United States increase the profits of
Canadian firms, as well. However, the adjustment is dominated by inter-
sectoral resource shifts. Interestingly, sectoral specialization in Canada in
the MS model occurs in many of the same industries as in the MC model. Output
in Canada increases in only six tradable sectors: leather products, footwear,
petroleum products, rubber products, nonelectrical. machinery, and transport
equipment. Due to increased specialization in Canada, U.S. imports from
Canada decline in several sectors, such as wood products (-17.2%), paper
products (-43.1%), printing and publishing (-6.0%), chemicals (-62.9%),
nonmetallic mineral products (-5.1%), nonferrous metals (-185.9%), and
miscellaneous manufactures (-68.1%). On the other hand, Canada's imports from
t a
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the United States increase in all categories except leather products (-73.2%)
and transportation equipment (-42.2%).
Exit accompanies the decline in output in most Canadian industries. The
number of Canadian firms increases only in leather products (1094.5%),
footwear (15.6%), petroleum products (72.0%), rubber products (14.0%),
nonelectrical machinery (2.5%), and transportation equipment (153.3%).
Though the MS and MC models yield similar inter-sectoral results, the two
models differ in one important respect. Rationalization is much more
prevalent for Canadian firms and much less prevalent for U.S. firms in the MS
model than in the MC model. A comparison of the percent change in industry
output and number of firms in Canada shows that output per firm rises in 16 of
the 22 tradable sectors. This result is similar to that obtained with the MC
model. However, rationalization also occurs in five of the seven nontradable
sectors, whereas all of the nontradable Canadian industries de-rationalized in
the MC model.
In the United States, de-rationalization occurs in furniture and
fixtures, petroleum products, rubber products, nonmetallic mineral products,
glass products, iron and steel, metal products, nonelectrical machinery, and
electrical machinery. In comparison, all U.S. industries increase output per
firm in the MC model, except miscellaneous manufactures. In the nontradable
industries, six of seven sectors de-rationalize in the MS model, compared to
none in the MC model.
The relative return to capital in Canada increases by 1.3 percent,
raising firm fixed costs. In order- to maintain zero profits, firm output in
Canada tends to rise. The return to capital in the U.S. increases as well,
but by a much smaller 0.1%. This result suggests that the rationalization
4 f 4
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effects in the model may be quite sensitive to the method used for calculating
the variable cost share, though demand side considerations are also affecting
firm behavior.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Our purpose in this paper has been to review the important modeling
issues involved in analyzing the economic effects of bilateral tariff removal
between the United States and Canada. The major modeling issues identified
include (1) improving modeling techniques for identifying the bilateral trade
which will be subject to tariff removal, (2) whether liberalization would lead
firms to increase output and capture scale economies in production,
(3) whether the gains from the agreement would stem from increased intra-
industry trade or inter-industry trade, and (4) whether terms-of-trade effects
or efficiency gains would dominate the welfare outcome of liberalization.
Three classes of models were identified as suitable for studying
bilateral tariff removal. These are models in which products are
differentiated at the national level, models in which products are
differentiated at the firm level, and models in which markets are segmented at
the national level.
In all three cases, markets may be imperfectly competitive as the result
of increasing returns to scale in production. Reaping economies of scale
provides an additional source of potential gain from trade liberalization,
which is thought to be especially important in the Canadian case because of
the small size of its national market. The determination of the scale of
production for each firm in a monopolistically competitive market was shown
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theoretically to depend on the factor-intensity ranking of the industries most
heavily protected. If liberalization raises the return to capital, thereby
increasing average total cost relative to marginal cost, firm output must rise
to satisfy the zero-profit and maximum-profit conditions. The opposite occurs
if the return to capital falls. Though the power of rationalization effects
may depend on country size, the direction does not.
Previous studies of the U.S.-Canada FTA have exhibited a strong tendency
toward the conclusions that increased trade will be primarily intra-industry,
rationalization will occur in most Canadian industries, but that Canada's
terms of trade will deteriorate. These results were shown in section II to be
influenced by the assumption of national product differentiation. In
particular, national product differentiation and strong terms-of-trade effects
appear to lie behind most negative welfare conclusions found for Canada.
Differentiating products by place of production is a convenient and
popular procedure for identifying bilateral trade flows. However, the
development of computational models with imperfectly competitive firms offers
an attractive alternative. We have not provided empirical evidence that
product differentiation is more likely to exist at the firm level than at the
national level. However, given the artificial nature of the assumption of
national product differentiation and its strong welfare, trade, and terms-of-
trade implications, it should be used sparingly and only on the condition that
this assumption is convincingly justified in each case. This is especially
the case, in view of the fact that differentiating products at the firm level
side steps many of the problems associated with differentiation at the
national level.
The theoretical results were illustrated using a general equilibrium
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computational model. Three market structures were adopted: perfect
competition with national product differentiation; monopolistic competition
with firm product differentiation; and a national market segmentation model
with homogeneous products.
The computational results from the monopolistic computation model without
national product differentiation indicate that rationalization depends on the
change in the return to capital, with the United States more likely to
experience rationalization than Canada. Strong inter-industry specialization
occurs, particularly in Canada, with output in Canada declining in 16 of the
22 tradable sectors and exports declining in 8 tradable sectors. Inter-
sectoral specialization gains are in part responsible for an increase in
Canadian welfare by 1.2 percent of GDP, despite the deterioration in Canada's
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1. The Armington assumptions are that the utility function is weakly
separable in goods and that the function used to aggregate the import and the
domestically produced good is linearly homogeneous. That is, the utility
function can be written as a function of the n goods, U-U(X 1 ,...,X), and each
good is an aggregate of the domestic and imported varieties, Xi=f(XM,XM).
These are simply the assumptions necessary for perfect aggregation as
demonstrated by Green (1964).
2. National product differentiation and the terms of trade effects of a
tariff are discussed in detail in Hamilton and Whalley (1983) and Brown
(1987).
3. See Brown and Stern (1988) for a summary and analysis of the various
studies of the U.S. Canada FTA.
4. Flam and Helpman (1987, p. 87) explore a similar model but cast their
results somewhat differently. They conclude that the utilization rate in
industry 2 depends on whether the absolute value of the elasticity of supply
of 2 with respect to the price of 1 is larger or smaller than the absolute
value of the elasticity of R & D with respect to the price of 1.
5. Horstmann and Markusen make the additional assumption that there is a




6. This strong result depends on two assumptions. First, there is only one
factor of production. As a result, the industry can expand without changing
relative factor prices. This implies that the slope of the ATC curve does not
change during the adjustment. Second, the demand for the domestic good is
assumed to shift in a parallel fashion in response to changes in the price of
imports. Thus, the slope of the demand curve is also unaffected. Together,
these two assumptions imply that the point of tangency between the ATC curve
and domestic demand will always occur at the same level of output.
7. Sufficient conditions for A>0 are that all countries of the model are
identical and that all countries impose a positive tariff. This implies that
yi y3 , xi - xi, and that yi > x . An alternative is that yj > xi + xi and
that yi > xi. That is, a typical firm sells more domestically than it
exports, and a domestic firm sells more to the domestic market than a foreign
firm.
8. This condition requires that a country 3 firm's sales to the domestic
market add more to profits than exports to country 1 as compared to a typical
firm in country 2. As a result, an increase in p1 and a fall in p3 that hold
country 3 firm profits at zero will imply positive profits for country 2
firms. Thus dp2 must be less than zero.
9. See the appendix to Brown and Stern (1988) for the proportionately
differentiated equations of the model.
10. The thirty-two countries are sixteen industrialized countries: Australia,
Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; and sixteen newly industrializing
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Hong Kong, India,
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Israel, Mexico, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, and
Yugoslavia.
11. Values for these parameters can be obtained from the authors on request.
12. See Brown and Stern (1987) and Boadway and Treddenick (1978).
TABLE 1
SUMMARY RESULTS OF A U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AREA:
CHANGES IN COUNTRY IMPORTS, EXPORTS, EXCHANGE RATES,
TERMS OF TRADE, AND WELFARE
(Trade and Welfare in Millions of U.S. Dollars)
| EXCHANGE TERMS OF TRADE EQUIVALENT
COUNTRY IMPORTS* EXPORTS* RATE** PERCENT CHANGE VARIATION
A. PERFECT COMPETITION: NATIONAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
United States 6981.3 6643.4 0.0 0.3 780.9
Other -1758.1 -1611.2 0.2 -0.1 -145.4
Canada 6254.8 6546.8 0.6 -0.7 -28.5
B. MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: FIRM PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
United States 9194.2 9051.7 0.0 0.1 476.1
Other -1882.1 -1762.7 0.1 -0.1 -116.1
Canada 9366.3 9557.0 -1.0 -0.5 2304.0
C. MARKET SEGMENTATION MODEL: HOMOGENEOUS PRODUCTS
United States 12947.9 12624.5 -0.0 0.2 -1175.3
Other -1547.3 -1620.2 -0.0 -0.1 -240.0
Canada 10668.0 10754.2 0.0 -0.3 -1389.1
D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS***: PERFECT COMPETITION
United States 14689.2 14372.4 -0.0 0.2 657.1
Other -2991.2 -2871.0 0.2 -0.1 -267.8
Canada 13190.4 13462.4 0.6 -0.7 -163.9
E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS***: MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
United States 19107.9 19024.4 0.0 0.1 -1002.8
Other -3181.4 -3101.0 0.0 -0.0 -55.9
Canada 18875.5 18980.3 -1.4 -0.3 2797.2
*Dollar value of change in trade volume.
**(+) indicates depreciation of currency.
***Elasticity of substitution between varieties increased above base run.
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TABLE 2
SECTORAL EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES OF U.S.-CANADA FREE
PERFECT COMPETITION
PERCENT CHANGE
TRADE, TARIFFS ONLY, POST-TOKYO ROUND
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TABLE 3
SECTORAL EFFECTS ON CANADA OF U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE,
PERFECT COMPETITION
PERCENT CHANGE
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TABLE 4
SECTORAL EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES OF U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE, TARIFFS ONLY, POST-TOKYO ROUND
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
PERCENT CHANGE
IMPORTS FROM NO. FIRMS
SECTOR EXPORTS OUTPUT ELASTICITY CAPITAL RENTAL RATE EMPLOYMENT
WORLD CANADA U.S. WORLD
Agriculture 0.4 3.2 17.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.0
Food 8.8 5.7 50.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Textiles 43.7 -1.0 72.0 5.0 4.8 4.6 0.1 4.8 0.1 5.0
Clothing 52.1. 1.9 234.2 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.9
Leather Prod. 2.7 5.8 72.2 -0.5 -0.6 0.3 0.0 -0.7 0.1 -0.5
Footwear 84.1 1.9 131.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.0 0.1 0.2
Wood Prod. 6.6 -5.8 -9.2 1.5 0.7 0.2 0.7 1.1 0.1 1.5
Furniture,
Fixtures 85.9 24.5 63.4 0.5 -0.8 -1.0 1.1 -0.6 0.1 0.5
Paper Prod. 19.4 -21.3 -23.3 3.5 2.0 0.8 1.3 2.5 0.1 3.5
Printing,
Publishing 11.6 -0.2 -6.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Chemicals 19.6 -11.5 -48.3 3.9 1.0 0.5 2.6 2.8 0.1 3.9
Petrol. Prod. 1.6 -1.0 -12.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.7
Rubber Prod. 27.6 12.4 63.8 -0.7 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 -0.8 0.1 -0.6
Nonmetal
Mineral Prod. 17.7 -1.3 -8.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.7
Glass Prod. 32.6 10.6 57.9 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.1 1.1
Iron & Steel 9.3 7.8 63.8 -1.6 -1.7 -1.5 0.0 -1.8 0.1 -1.6
Nonferr. Metals 5.2 28.4 76.9 -6.5 -6.6 -2.9 0.0 -6.6 0.1 -6.5
Metal Prod. 30.6 9.8 52.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.1
Nonelectrical
Machinery 7.4 5.8 22.6 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.7
Electrical Mach. 15.9 2.5 60.1 1.2 -0.2 -0.3 1.2 0.1 0.1 1.2
Transport Equip. -11.0 44.6 96.0 -7.6 -15.8 -11.3 7.5 -13.1 0.1 -7.5
Misc. Mfrs. 10.0 -0.3 -1.3 2.0 2.3 1.1 -0.4 2.1 0.1 2.0
Mining & Quarrying 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Utilities 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.1 0.1
Construction -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.1
Wholesale Trade -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.1
Transportation 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Financial Services -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Personal Services -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.1
TABLE 5
SECTORAL EFFECTS ON CANADA OF U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE, TARIFFS ONLY, POST-TOKYO ROUND
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
PERCENT CHANGE
IMPORTS FROM NO. FIRMS
SECTOR EXPORTS OUTPUT ELASTICITY CAPITAL RENTAL RATE EMPLOYMENT
WORLD U.S. CANADA WORLD
Agriculture -1.2 22.1 32.4 -4.8 -4.6 -4.2 -0.1 -4.5 -1.1 -5.4
Food 20.8 34.7 78.1 -1.8 -1.8 -1.7 0.2 -0.9 -1.1 -2.0
Textiles 5.1 112.3 212.9 -32.5 -33.6 -24.6 0.5 -32.8 -1.1 -32.6
Clothing 86.5 31.9 279.0 -5.1 -6.0 -4.8 0.4 -4.5 -1.1 -5.1
Leather Prod. 42.8 1.7 25.4 37.2 36.1 4.0 1.0 37.4 -1.1 37.2
Footwear 91.6 12.2 254.4 2.8 0.9 0.6 1.3 3.2 -1.1 2.7
Wood Prod. -10.4 34.8 41.7 -9.0 -6.5 -5.5 -2.2 -6.8 -1.1 -9.1
Furniture,
Fixtures 62.4 116.2 177.6 -1.2 -13.1 -11.7 11.1 -9.1 -1.1 -1.3
Paper Prod. -22.6 93.9 100.4 -20.4 -19.3 -17.4 -0.9 -19.4 -1.1 -20.5
Printing,
Publishing -7.2 20.0 22.7 -4.9 -3.0 -2.6 -1.4 -3.0 -1.1 -5.1
Chemicals -50.4 91.0 116.1 -52.4 -38.2 -27.4 -13.1 -44.0 -1.1 -52.7
Petrol. Prod. -12.0 12.1 17.2 -9.6 -9.9 '-2.5 0.5 -6.9 -1.1 -9.7
Rubber Prod. 60.2 52.1 92.2 18.7 18.1 13.9 0.5 23.1 -1.1 18.4
Nonmetal
Mineral Prod. -11.8 44.0 66.6 -10.6 -10.4 -8.2 -0.0 -9.7 -1.1 -10.9
Glass Prod. 39.1 65.8 86.5 -20.1 -22.3 -14.0 2.1 -20.2 -1.1 -20.3
Iron & Steel 48.3 33.5 69.7 27.4 27.0 22.6 0.6 27.5 .- 1.1 27.4
Nonferr. Metals 68.0 24.6 44.7 68.1 67.7 -4.1 0.2 68.2 -1.1 68.1
Metal Prod. 32.7 85.3 116.6 -3.0 -3.8 -3.3 0.8 -2.8 -1.1 -3.0
None1ectrical
Machinery 15.1 21.1 32.2 -9.6 -13.1 -3.1 3.1 -11.2 -1.1 -9.7
Electrical Mach. 31.5 58.6 93.6 -10.4 -16.7 -12.7 5.4 -15.1 -1.1 -10.5
Transport Equip. 89.4 -20.7 -21.4 85.1 48.6 18.3 33.2 50.1 -1.1 85.1
Misc. Mfrs. -3.2 27.5 55.0 -18.8 -33.5 -12.8 13.3 -27.4 -1.1 -18.9
Mining & Quarrying -2.2 -2.0 -0.1 -1.6 -1.1 -3.3
Utilities -1.5 -1.0 -0.1 -0.4 -1.1 -2.9
Construction 0.7 0.8 0.1 1.6 -1.1 0.4
Wholesale Trade 0.9 1.4 0.2 3.0 -1.1 0.4
Transportation 0.6 1.0 0.1 2.0 -1.1 0.3
Financial Services 1.1 1.3 0.1 1.9 -1..1 0.1
Personal Services 0.3 0.9 0.1 1.2 -1.1 -0.1
P
TABLE 6




SECTOR EXPORTS OUTPUT FIRMS PRICE MARGINAL CAPITAL RENTAL RATE EMPLOYMENT
WORLD CANADA U.S. COST
Agriculture 5.3 0.6 13.2 1.2 1.0 -0.0 -0.0 1.1 0.1 1.3
Food 15.3 4.5 59.6 0.2 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Textiles 67.9 -7.1 81.6 8.1 6.9 -0.5 -0.2 7.2 0.1 8.1
Clothing 77.3 -4.2 303.0 2.5 2.1 -0.3 -0.2 2.3 0.1 2.5
Leather Prod. -45.8 92.9 1150.9 -42.1 -42.2 0.2 -0.0 -42.3 0.1 -42.1
Footwear 104.4 -1.4 219.4 1.4 1.4 -0.1 -0.0 1.2 0.1 1.4
Wood Prod. 12.1 -11.8 -17.2 2.9 2.4 -0.1 -0.0 2.8 0.1 3.0
Furniture,
Fixtures 114.5. 27.4 76.6 0.4 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4
Paper Prod. 31.9 -39.6 -43.1 6.2 5.3 -0.2 -0.1 5.5 0.1 6.3
Printing,
Publishing 17.0 -2.0 -6.0 0.4 0.3 -0.0 -0.0 0.3 0.1 0.4
Chemicals 30.8 -17.3 -62.9 6.3 5.5 -0.3 -0.0 5.8 0.1 6.3
Petrol. Prod. -1.1 10.4 72.2 -4.5 -4.4 0.0 0.0 -4.6 0.1 -4.3
Rubber Prod. 45.3 11.1 69.1 -0.8 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 0.1 -0.8
Nonmetal
Mineral Prod. 24.2 -2.3 -5.1 0.8 0.9 -0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.8
Glass Prod. 39.3 12.4 81.7 0.6 0.9 -0.1 -0.0 0.6 0.1 0.6
Iron & Steel 12.2 3.1 40.9 -3.0 -1.8 0.1 0.0 -2.2 0.1 -3.0
Nonferr. Metals 21.2 -67.0 -185.9 14.7 10.8 -0.1 -0.0 14.1 0.1 14.7
Metal Prod. 42.4 9.8 64.7 -0.9 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.9
Nonelectrical -
Machinery 10.2 10.8 48.4 0.5 0.6 -0.1 -0.0 0.5 0.1 0.5
Electrical Mach. 24.5 0.2 72.6 1.8 2.0 -0.1 -0.0 1.9 0.1 1.8
Transport Equip. -28.6 88.3 185.6 -17.6 -18.0 0.3 0.0 -17.9 0.1 -17.6
Misc. Mfrs. 25.0 -11.8 -68.1 7.4 7.2 -0.2 -0.0 7.3 0.1 7.5
Mining & Quarrying -2.0 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -2.0 0.1 -1.9
Utilities 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Construction -0.2 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.1
Wholesale Trade -0.2 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.1 -0.1
Transportation -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.0
Financia1 Services -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0








SECTOR EXPORTS OUTPUT FIRMS PRICE MARGINAL CAPITAL RENTAL RATE EMPLOYMENT
WORLD U.S. CANADA COST
Agriculture -11.5 38.7 55.3 -11.2 -7.8 0.9 0.5 -11.0 1.3 -10.5
Food 20.7 49.9 110.5 -4.2 -4.0 0.5 0.5 -5.2 1.3 -4.1
Textiles -16.3 160.1 297.6 -39.8 -46.8 -0.6 -0.1 -46.1 1.3 -39.7
Clothing 111.0 42.1 378.1 -10.9 -11.3 -0.4 -0.4 -13.0 1.3 -10.9
Leather Prod. 1116.8 -93.6 -73.2 1098.2 1094.5 -7.6 -0.3 1095.4 1.3 1098.3
Footwear 170.0. -21.6 304.8 20.6 15.6 -2.6 -2.0 15.3 1.3 20.7
Wood Prod. -18.0 48.8 58.7 -15.4 -13.9 0.7 0.4 -15.8 1.3 -15.3
Furniture,
Fixtures 75.4 151.1 233.7 -5.4 -9.2 -0.9 -0.0 -9.3 1.3 -5.4
Paper Prod. -42.3 134.6 143.5 -34.9 -31.8 1.4 0.5 -34.7 1.3 -34.7
Printing,
Publishing -6.6 26.4 30.5 -4.1 -4.5 0.5 0.4 -5.6 1.3 -4.1
Chemicals -64.9 127.1 161.6 -72.5 -64.2 1.4 0.4 -69.4 1.3 -72.1
Petrol. Prod. 72.2 -5.4 17.2 75.3 72.0 -0.2 0.1 72.4 1.3 77.0
Rubber Prod. 64.8 84.8 140.7 35.3 14.0 -1.9 0.2 16.3 1.3 35.8
Nonmetal
Mineral Prod. -8.1 52.0 83.2 -7.9 -10.5 -0.3 0.0 -10.5 1.3 -7.6
Glass Prod. 57.4 72.1 99.4 -14.1 -23.4 -1.9 0.0 -20.8 1.3 -13.9
Iron & Steel 23.9 34.5 82.8 -19.3 -11.7 0.3 -0.0 -12.5 1.3 -19.3
Nonferr. Metals -191.6 21.4 50.1 -191.9 -195.0 0.5 0.2 -192.6 1.3 -191.8
Metal Prod. 37.9 113.9 156.2 -4.0 -8.9 -0.4 0.1 -7.5 1.3 -3.9
Nonelectrical
Machinery 37.6 22.6 37.6 5.3 2.5 -2.8 -0.2 1.2 1.3 5.5
Electrical Mach. 35.0 80.0 127.7 -14.7 -19.0 -0.9 -0.4 -18.1 1.3 -14.6
Transport Equip. 185.3 -40.3 -42.2 170.6 153.3 -4.3 -1.4 156.8 1.3 170.7
Misc. Mfrs. -70.0 60.5 100.2 -76.7 -78.7 -0.2 0.2 -78.7 1.3 -76.3
Mining & Quarrying 33.1 14.1 -0.0 0.7 31.3 1.3 34.6
Utilities -3.3 -1.9 0.8 0.6 -4.3 1.3 -1.6
Construction -0.9 -1.0 0.2 0.1 -2.0 1.3 -0.5
Wholesale Trade -0.4 -0.7 0.3 0.3 -3.0 1.3 0.1
Transportation 0.1 -0.5 0.1 0.1 -1.7 1.3 0.5
Financial Services 1.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.1 1.3 2.4
Personal Services -1.8 -1.3 0.5 0.4 -2.6 1.3 -1.3
)
i
i

